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Abstract— Traffic analysis in Multi-hop Wireless Net-
works can expose the structure of the network allowing
attackers to focus their efforts on critical nodes. For
example, jamming the only data sink in a sensor network
can cripple the network. We propose a new communica-
tion protocol that is part of the MAC layer, but resides
conceptually between the routing layer and MAC, that is
resilient to traffic analysis. Each node broadcasts the data
that it has to transmit according to a fixed transmission
schedule that is independent of the traffic being generated,
making the network immune to time correlation analysis.
The transmission pattern is identical, with the exception
of a possible time shift, at all nodes, removing spatial
correlation of transmissions to network strucutre. Data for
all neighbors resides in the same encrypted packet. Each
neighbor then decides which subset of the data in a packet
to forward onwards using a routing protocol whose details
are orthogonal to the proposed scheme. We analyze the
basic scheme, exploring the tradeoffs in terms of frequency
of transmission and packet size. We also explore adaptive
and time changing patterns and analyze their performance
under a number of representative scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Technological advances in VLSI, MEMS, and wireless
communication have ushered in a new age of miniature,
low cost, low-energy, micro-sensors. Networks of such
devices, called Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), hold
the promise of revolutionizing sensing across a range
of civil, scientific, military and industrial applications.
This emerging technology provides an opportunity to
collect information at unprecedented resolution due to
their low cost, small size, ease of deployment, and ability
to provide fine-grained up-close sensing. It is anticipated
that instrumenting physical environment with thousands
of tiny sensing devices can significantly improve our
understanding of the real world and provide one of the
necessary interfaces between the physical and digital
worlds.
Traffic analysis can be of major concern to secure
multi-hop wireless networks. Since packets are trans-
mitted over open air, they can be easily intercepted.
The use of encryption protects the confidentiality of the
data. However, the network becomes vulnerable to traffic
analysis where an adversary can extract the pattern of
communication if not its contents. Knowing the pattern
of communication can be used to guide more effective
attacks on the network. For example, the attacker can
jam a base station or critical relay nodes to cripple large
parts of the network with a modest effort. Further, the
information about what nodes are communicating can
itself be sensitive. For example, in a military scenario,
if an adversary observes increased sensor activity in
an area, it may deduce that its assets there have been
discovered and move them before they are attacked.
The main enabler for traffic analysis is that data
communication is event driven. Thus, when a node has
data to send, it sends it immediately, subject to its MAC
layer protocol. An attacker, can derive the presence of
data from the time correlation of packet sends. Further, it
can extract the spatial communication pattern by tracking
which relay nodes forward a packet onwards.
Thus, to protect from traffic analysis, the data traffic
must be engineered to make it impossible to extract
temporal or spatial correlation of physical transmission
to the presence of data. We discuss some of the existing
related work in Section II.
The primary contribution of this paper is a Traffic-
Analysis Resilient MAC protocol (TARMAC). In TAR-
MAC the traffic generated by each node is independent
of data (and control packets) to be sent by it. Instead
each node sends encrypted frames, each consisting of
multiple packets, in a pattern that is the same across
all nodes, with the exception of a possible time shift
that is independent of the data. The generated frame
is broadcast locally without a specific destination and
is received by all neighbors. The size of the frame is
independent of the amount of actual data it contains (for
example, it may be constant in size). Each frame consists
of all the data the node has to transmit to all its neighbors
(up to the size of the frame).
Neighboring nodes pick up the broadcast frame, and
may decide to forward portions of it onwards when it
is their time to send according to the routing protocol
(which is orthogonal to this functionality, but as we show
later, could gain from being aware of the transmission
pattern). Thus, each packet may contain multiple pieces
of data destined to different locations. Each receiving
node may forward a subset of the data packets in a frame,
combined with other packets from other nodes, in the
next frame it generates.
A useful analogy is a vehicle transportation system.
Existing MAC protocol have data packets each using
their own car (even-driven transmission), allowing an
intruder to simply observe the presence of a car to detect
data transmissions and to follow the car’s progression to
extract spatial pattern of communication. In TARMAC,
there are only buses that leave to preset locations at
scheduled intervals. At every stop, passengers from dif-
ferent arriving buses may hop onto other buses that take
them towards their destination. To an outside observer,
the buses always leave on schedule, regardless of what
passengers are inside them (or in fact, whether there are
any passengers at all).
Different routing protocols and, in fact, link layer
ones can inter-operate with TARMAC. The routing pro-
tocol defines how the data packets are processed at the
next hop (how passengers move from bus to bus). For
example, the source may indicate who the next hop
is, say by geographic routing, and in that case, only
the designated next hop forwards a piece of data. Any
other routing protocol can be used instead. Similarly,
Link level reliability may be implemented by having
the next hop acknowledge a packet when it is its time
to broadcast. Alternatively, as each node broadcasts
packets the next hop forwarding a packet can act as
an implicit acknowledgement. The scheme is described
more formally in Section III.
Clearly, analysis resilience comes at a cost. For ex-
ample, having to follow pre-set schedules implies that
average packet delay will be higher; passengers that
use public transportation expect a longer travel time
than those with their own car. Further, to make the
structure of the network resistant to analysis, the pattern
of transmission should be independent of the location in
the network; otherwise, the pattern is open for spatial
analysis where critical nodes are identified by their level
of activity. In contrast to traditional bus systems, where
buses merge at intermediate hubs that have much higher
activity than edge stops, for passenger exchange, this
model requires over-provisioning such that even distant
stops act as hubs. As a result, it is likely that many
of the frames near these edge stops do not have many
passengers (otherwise, hubs wont have enough buses to
carry their passengers). We analyze these tradeoffs and
explore the effect of critical parameters such as send rate,
frame size and traffic pattern on the performance of the
basic TARMAC.
We also consider approaches for improving the effi-
ciency of the scheme in Section IV. More specifically,
we explore adapting the transmission pattern (uniformly)
to match the desired capacity. Further, we explore time-
varying transmission schedules where only portions of
the network display high transmission rates at a given
time. The portions of high activity change over time
such that all nodes still have the same transmission
pattern (only shifted in time). The routing protocol is
aware of the changing capacity and can direct packets
to areas of the network that currently have high capacity.
In Section V we evaluate the basic scheme, as well as
these improvements to it. Finally, Section VI presents
some concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Deng et al [1] discuss the traffic analysis problem as
it relates to Multi-Hop Wireless Networks (MHWNs).
They isolate the following properties that enable traffic
analysis: (1) Time correlation between receiving and
forwarding a packet. Using this correlation an adversary
can track the progression of a packet and extract the
structure of the connections and network; (2) Unen-
crypted packets: if packets are plain text, they can be
studied to find the next hop and this can be done
successively to get to the base-station; and (3) Areas of
interest and areas near the base-station generally have
higher traffic, the activity level can then be used to
identify such key points. Resilience to traffic analysis
requires eliminating all three of the above ingredients.
Traffic analysis has been studied in the context of
wired and wireless networks (e.g., [2], [3]). In wired
networks onion routing [4] is the prominent anti-traffic
analysis protocol. It camouflages the destination by
routing through intermediate proxies. In wired networks,
however, hop-to-hop behavior is not in question and only
the source and destination are being protected. In warless
networks, the channel is broadcast in nature and there is
a correlation between receiving a packet and sending it
and this can be used to determining flow directions. Also,
since wireless networks generally have low duty cycles
sudden increase in sending rates at a particular location
would mean an event has taken place at that location.
Deng et al propose the use of multi-path multi-base-
station routing to protect against traffic analysis [1].
Data packets flow up routing trees towards the base
station. To prevent traffic analysis each node transmits
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at fixed time intervals irrespective of the data present.
If a node has data, it forwards it in it alloted time slot,
otherwise it just forwards dummy packets. If a node does
not hear its packet forwarded, it keeps sending the same
packet when its time slot arrives. This scheme is different
from TARMAC in a number of ways. TARMAC takes
advantage of the broadcast nature of the wireless channel
to group all outgoing packets from a node together.
Deng’s approach attempts to reduce hot-spots by limiting
flows feeding into a hot-spot. They do not protect control
packets that need to be flooded in the network. The
latency is much higher for this approach because a
node transmits a packet to its parent only when it starts
transmitting dummy packets or it over hears the parent
node transmitting its packet. Every node has to change
the encryption so that packets are not followed easily by
an adversary. In TARMAC, the packets are disassembled
and reassembled at each node; thus, it does not require
that a unique key be applied at every hop.
In a followup work [5] the authors propose random-
izing the path taken by every packet so that a pattern is
not found. They also proposes having some packets in
addition to their path take random fake paths to take
an adversary in the wrong direction. The paper goes
on to propose generating random areas of high traffic
(hot-spots) to misguide an adversary. This solution is
a routing level solution with different properties than
TARMAC. To our knowledge these are the only works
on traffic analysis in sensor networks. We compare
TARMAC against both of these works in Section V.
III. TARMAC: BASIC SCHEME
In this section, we present the basic TARMAC
scheme. We also discuss tradeoffs and expected behavior
of this base model. The drawbacks of the model in terms
of energy efficiency and increased contention pave the
way for the suggested improvements in the next Section.
A. Basic TARMAC Scheme
TARMAC is a MAC layer protocol that takes in to
consideration the makes traffic resistant to analysis by
using uniform (but possibly time-shifted) transmission
schedules at all nodes. TARMAC emulates the com-
munication network alternative of a city bus system.
TARMAC uses encrypted frames that are sent at pre-
scheduled times (it can inter operate with different
link/MAC layers), irrespective of the presence of data
packets. Different outgoing data packets, possibly tar-
geted to different destinations and next hops, are placed
in the same TARMAC frame; any empty slots are left
empty. Note that empty slots are hidden by the encryp-
tion and the occupancy of each frame is not visible to the
attacker. Each receiver of the frame can examine it and
decide which packets are its responsibility to forward:
virtually any routing protocol can be used to establish
routing responsibilities.
TARMAC frames resemble public buses in that they
have a fixed number of slots and leave at pre-scheduled
times, with passengers (data-packets) taking up seats
in the bus. In typical public transportation systems,
provisioning is not uniform: for example, stops at remote
routes have much lower bus activity and perhaps smaller
buses than a central hub where many routes converge.
Thus, extracting the structure of the public transportation
network by simply observing the level of activity at a
stop becomes possible.
To protect against such analysis TARMAC requires
that all nodes follow the same schedule (later, we con-
sider the possibility of a time-shift). The basic TARMAC
scheme we discuss in this section is one where all
the nodes transmit with a fixed period and fixed size
packets; later we explore relaxing this model. Having
the transmission times and sizes be uncorrelated to the
data transport being carried through TARMAC makes
it impossible to detect the presence of, for example,
event based data. Furthermore, the broadcast nature of
the wireless medium hides information about the receiver
of the packet; thus, a TARMAC frame is like a number
of concurrent buses that leave to each of the one-hop
neighbors.
In contrast to these advantages of TARMAC, con-
ventional MAC transmit data only when there is data
to transmit, providing valuable information to attackers.
Further, a data packet can be followed as it is retransmit-
ted by intermediate hops to extract the full connection
and the eventual destination.
B. Basic Parameters and Provisioning
In the basic model with periodic equal size frame, the
relevant parameters are the transmission period τ and
the size of the frame in slots s. The capacity, measured
in slots per node per second, for the basic TARMAC
can theoretically be expressed as s
τ
. Within the physical
limitations of the channel, increasing either s or reducing
τ leads to increasing capacity by either sending larger
packets or sending packets more often respectively.
However, sending smaller frames more frequently fosters
shorter delays, but increases frame overhead. In addition,
larger size frames are more vulnerable to collisions and
transmission losses.
A tension between the capacity of the network and the
energy efficiency of TARMAC arises. At one extreme,
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all nodes may be made to appear like a remote station,
leading to energy efficiency but loss of capacity since the
bottleneck nodes now do not have sufficient capacity to
carry the offered load. On the other extreme, the network
may be provisioned so that all nodes are transmitting at a
sufficient rate to enable the bottleneck nodes to continue
to forward the traffic. This leads to excessive overhead
in remote or idle areas. These and other drawbacks are
discussed in the next subsection.
C. Drawbacks of Basic TARMAC
To be able to carry the required traffic, the basic
TARMAC must be provisioned sufficiently such that
s
τ
is greater or equal the required traffic at bottleneck
nodes. However, provisioning for the worst case has the
following drawbacks:
• Over or under-provisioning: it is difficult to predict
what the maximum bottleneck capacity is for some
networks. The maximum reporting rate may be
difficult to predict or the deployment may be ad
hoc making a-priori analysis of bottleneck nodes
difficult. As a result, the choice of s and τ may
lead to insufficient capacity to carry the reported
data and leading to increased delay and loss of data
as buffer sizes grow. Alternatively, it may lead to
more aggressive sending and loss of efficiency as
most slots remain idle.
• Possible High Energy Cost: By provisioning to the
rate of the expected bottleneck, most of the nodes
will be transmitting at a rate higher than that needed
to carry their traffic. We note here that as long as an
average occupancy of more than one slot per frame
the total number of transmissions will be reduced.
However, the size of each frame will be likely be
bigger than the size of the individual data packets
due to over-provisioning; some savings in framing
and protocol overhead may result from combining
multiple packets into a single transmission.
• Low maximum throughput: As the node capacity
is increased by reducing the period or increasing
the size, all nodes start sending more aggressively
and the contention level increases. This includes
nodes that do not have high occupancy, limiting the
maximum throughput that can be achieved by nodes
that do have data to send.
• Increased delay: Since each node is not forwarding
the packets as soon as it gets it, there may be a
larger packet delivery latency as packets wait for
the next frame transmission at every intermediate
hop.
In the next section, we identify a number of improve-
ments to the base TARMAC that address some of these
drawbacks.
IV. IMPROVEMENTS AND EXTENSIONS
In this section we discuss a number of improvements
to the basic TARMAC in response to the drawbacks
identified in the previous section.
A. Adaptive TARMAC
Static provisioning of TARMAC in terms of s and
τ can lead to a TARMAC configuration that is either
insufficient to sustain the reported data, exceeds even
the bottleneck requirements, or unsustainable in some
areas of the network due to exceeding the capacity of the
channel. We propose an adaptive version of TARMAC
that allows adjustment of the reporting rate or bus size
and works as follows.
• Increasing capacity: When a node detects that its
traffic demands exceed its capacity, it requests an
increase in the reporting rate. The increase is re-
quested from the base-station (or a rate regulation
leader), which can periodically adjust the overall
rate based on the observed behavior. Adjustment is
initiated through a flood packet (within the TAR-
MAC mechanism) that proposes a new rate and a
time when the nodes should switch to it. Precise
synchronization is not needed. The nodes then all
switch to the new rate.
• Reducing capacity: Capacity should be reduced
in two cases: (1) a TARMAC rate exceeds local
channel capacity; and (2) the TARMAC rate is too
high and exceeds the need of all nodes. In the first
case, nodes may elect to reduce capacity if the
current TARMAC rate locally exceeds the available
bandwidth. This will occur in high density areas. A
reduction in schedule in such a condition is allowed
because it does not reflect information about the
traffic, but only the local density. In the second case,
several options are possible, including tracking the
maximum occupancy observed by packets along the
way, and informing the regulator if the maximum
of these is low.
Note that adapting the transmission activity to the bottle-
neck load allows attackers to detect the bottleneck level
of activity of the network (but not where this bottleneck
is). However, we believe that the advantages in terms of
capacity and efficiency makes exposing this information
worthwhile.
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B. Use of Multi-Path Routing
High energy expenditure and low effective capac-
ity may arise in basic TARMAC due to frames that
are sparsely populated, wasting energy and occupying
available channel time, leaving less of it available for
frames carrying data. In response to this problem, we
propose that the routing protocol should be aware of
the TARMAC characteristics. For basic TARMAC, this
entails the use of multi-path routing [6] to take advantage
of the available capacity in nearby nodes. In conven-
tional multi-hop wireless networks, the use of multi-path
routing often does not lead to appreciable improvement
in capacity because some of the links making up the
different paths may be in interference range with each
other, reducing the available bandwidth for each. For
TARMAC, this is not the case because multi-path routing
simply takes advantage of the available slots and does
not require any additional transmissions.
C. Non-uniform TARMAC Schedule
Thusfar, we have assumed that the identical schedule
maintained by all the nodes is a simple periodic one
where all nodes transmit at the same period and with the
same size. As we have seen, these leads to uncontrolled
contention, especially in areas that are dense. However,
an interesting possibility is to allow periodic schedules
that do not have a fixed transmission rate. For example,
nodes may alternative between a high send rate and a
low send rate state. At a given instance, only some of
the nodes are in the high rate portion of their schedule
and contention is reduced. More complex schedules, as
well as the possibility of adapting the schedule, are also
possible. All nodes have the same schedule, with the
exception of a time-shift, retaining the desirable traffic-
analysis resilience features.
Within these general parameters a large solution space
emerges based on the type of the schedule, and coordi-
nating which nodes are in the high send rate together.
These sets of nodes must be sufficient to provide connec-
tivity and capacity to carry the desired traffic. Further,
since the set of high rate nodes (which are most suitable
as relay nodes) changes with time, the routing protocol
should be able to adaptively use the high rate nodes.
A promising example of this class of TARMAC is one
where nodes self-organize into clusters and synchronize
activity periods such that at least one node is active at
any given time. Routing based on zone addresses (e.g., as
in GAF [7]) is then used to automatically use the current
high rate node as the forwarding node for connections
going through these area. As nodes change schedules
they change forwarding responsibilities; nodes about to
Parameter value
No. of Data Sources 100
Traffic type CBR
CBR packet size 32B
Transmission Range 40 meters
BandWidth 2Mbps
Routing Period 5 seconds
Traffic Period 100 seconds
Simulation Period 400 seconds
TARMAC slot size 64 Byte
TABLE I
SOME SIMULATION PARAMETERS
become forwarders should retain recent packets that have
not been forwarded yet so that they can forward them
when they switch to the high rate mode. We do not study
this flavor of TARMAC in this paper. We intend to do
so in a follow-up paper in the near future.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present an experimental evalu-
ation exploring the performance of TARMAC under
different conditions, and compare it against two existing
schemes for protection against traffic analysis in sensor
networks[1], [5]; we call these solutions Intrusion 1 and
Intrustion 2 respectively. We also compare against an
unprotected network to evaluate the overhead necessary
for camouflaging traffic. We implemented TARMAC in
network simulator NS2 (version 2.29) [8], by extending
IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol according to our design. To
enable fair comparison, we also implemented Intrusion
1 and 2 on NS2 (they were implemented on TinyOS
originally).
In our experiments, 100 sensors are regularly deployed
in 10×10 grids covering an area of 200×200meter2, in
which each node is located at the center of each grid. The
table I shows some simulation parameters general for all
studies. Other simulation parameters are summarized in
Table I unless explicitly stated.
A. Analysis of Basic TARMAC
Figure 1 shows the delivery ratio of shortest path
routing on TARMAC as a function of the size of the
frame and the transmission period. When TARMAC has
a small period, even when the buses are small, the
delivery ratio is high since the collision ratio is low as
bigger frames suffer more collisions (Figure 3). When
the period is large, if the bus size is small, then the
effective capacity is not sufficient to carry the packets
5
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
TARMAC number of slots
D
el
iv
er
y 
Ra
tio
TP 0.05
TP 0.07
TP 0.09
TP 0.20
TP 0.40
TP: TARMAC transmission period
Fig. 1. TARMAC Delivery Ratio Study
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
TARMAC number of slots
B
us
 O
cc
up
ac
y 
Ra
tio
TP 0.05
TP 0.07
TP 0.09
TP 0.20
TP 0.40
TP: TARMAC transmission period
Fig. 2. TARMAC Bus Occupation Study
leading to increased packet delay and reduced delivery
ratio.
When the bus size increases, more collision happen
and more packets are dropped due to collisions. For those
with longer periods, the delivery ratio increases since
each frame carries more packets. After some point, the
collision ratio dominates as the physical capacity of the
channel is reached. Figure 2 shows the occupation ratio
of TARMAC bus packets (effective packets / number of
slots). As can be expected, the longer the transmission
period, the higher the bus occupation ratio. Figure 4
shows the average delay of all effective packets. As
the transmission period increases, the time to get from
source to destination increases. The smaller the buses
are, the longer is the time needed to reach the destination
as packets wait at each intermediate node. Figure 5
shows the energy consumption per packet. More energy
is expended when the period is reduced (sending more
often) or when the frame size is increased.
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B. TARMAC with different traffic patterns
In this section, we study the performance of TAR-
MAC under different traffic patterns. In the same grid
scenario, we change the number of data sources and their
distribution in the networks, considering the following
3 cases: all nodes as data sources, 1
3
(∼ 35) nodes as
data sources and a quarter of nodes in the same corner
are data sources. We also study two CBR send rates: 2
packets per second and 1 packet per second.
Figure 6 shows the delivery ratios of TARMAC with
different traffic patterns. As can be expected, the higher
the data rate, the lower the delivery ratio. The capacity of
the bus also impacts the delivery ratio. The delivery ratio
of pattern with 35 nodes is higher than that of only 25
nodes. The reason is that those 25 nodes are in the same
crowded area creating hotspotting along the path to the
basestation. The average delay and energy consumption
are shown in figures 7, 8 and follow expectations.
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C. TARMAC vs Intrusion 1
In this study, we compare the performance of TAR-
MAC and the Intrusion 1 solution [1]. We select one
node as a data sink in the up-left corner of the simulation
area. Each node in the network generates a CBR data
traffic to the sink with a 2 packets per second rate.
Figure 9 shows the overall delay of TARMAC and
Intrusion 1, against that of Shortest Path routing which
serves as an upper bound on performance. As we can
see, the buffer size affects the performance of intrusion
1 as well as bare SP. But TARMAC is not affected
apparently by the buffer size. The reason may be due
to the broadcast nature of TARMAC, and the unicast
nature of intrusion 1 and SP. Since they use unicast,
both intrusion 1 and SP may forward packet with best
effort, holding packets for possible retransmission until
success. TARMAC only holds packet for next available
bus. So if the transmission period is low enough, the
required buffer size is not big.
Figure 10 shows a somewhat surprising result about
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
TARMAC Interval (TI)
A
ve
ra
ge
 D
el
ay
 o
f e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
pa
ck
et
s
All 100 Node 2p/s
All 100 Node 1p/s
35 nodes scattered 2p/s
35 nodes scattered 1p/s
15 nodes in one corner 2p/s
15 nodes in one corner 1p/s
Fig. 7. TARMAC Delay Study
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
0.0045
TARMAC Interval (TI)
En
er
gy
 C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
pe
r e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
Pa
ck
et
s
All 100 Node 2p/s
All 100 Node 1p/s
35 nodes scattered 2p/s
35 nodes scattered 1p/s
15 nodes in one corner 2p/s
15 nodes in one corner 1p/s
Fig. 8. TARMAC Average Energy Consumption Study
the energy consumption per data packet received by the
data sink. The energy consumption per effective packet
of TARMAC is nearly the same as the ideal optimal
solution. However, this result is reasonable since each
data packet is transmitted at each hop only once, requir-
ing nothing more than itself (in term of transmission).
Another reason leads to this result is the lower delivery
ratio. Some packets were dropped at the early stage
of its traveling from source to sink. We can reach this
conclusion more directly from Figure 11 and 12. Since
unicast transmission used by intrusion and SP requires
control packets (RTS/CTS, ACK, etc.), the number of
packets transmitted physically is higher than that with
broadcasting: with TARMAC, all packets –routing, arp,
data– are transmitted through broadcasting. M/m refers
to the total number of packets transmitted physically
(MAC layer packets) over the number of effective pack-
ets (data packets received by sink). S/m indicates the
total size (in bytes) of packets transmitted physically
over the size of effective packets.
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Figure 13 shows the average end-to-end delay of all
effective packets. The average delay of TARMAC is
shorter than it of SP may due to the lower delivery
ratio (most packets with longer delay are dropped before
reaching the sink).
D. TARMAC vs Intrusion 2
Intrusion 2 [5] does not buffer incoming packets: only
one packet is held for forwarding at each hop. Each
node keeps sending the held packet until it overhears the
forwarding of the corresponding packet at the next hop.
Buffer size does not affect the performance of TARMAC
as well as was shown in the previous section.
Figure 14 shows the delivery ratio of TARMAC and
intrusion 2 with respect to the fixed transmission rate.
The black straight line stands the delivery ratio of ideal
optimal solution (SP). As the fixed transmission rate
decreases, the delivery ratio decreases as well since the
capacity of the bus decreases. As we can see if the
buffer size is double of TARMAC, the performance is
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considerably better. Intrusion 2 can not benefit the in-
creasing of the buffer size due to its design is just holding
one packet. Figure 15 shows the energy consumption
per effective packet. The situation is the same as we
discussed before. Intrusion 2 tries to retransmit a data
packet many times at each hop through the forwarding
path. Meanwhile, no matter what the buffer size is,
TARMAC just forwards each packet once at each hop.
Figure 18 shows the average end-to-end delay of all
effective packets. The straight line at bottom is that of
the ideal solution (SP). At first, the average delay of
TARMAC with all buffer sizes are shorter than that of
SP, perhaps due to the lower delivery ratio: most data
packets with longer delay were dropped. As the buffer
sizes increase, the average delay of TARMAC increases.
E. Evaluation of Multipath Routing and Adaption of
TARMAC frame frequency
The routing layer is orthogonal to TARMAC, however,
if it makes uses TARMAC it can greatly increase its
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performance. Let us assume that the routing layer just
implements, say, shortest path routing. Now, if there
is an event at a certain location and all the nodes at
that location start sending data suddenly, the capacity
of the network will be reached and the queues would
fill up causing packets to be dropped. In addition to
this, the empty TARMAC frames from nodes adjacent
to the data flow would interfere with the data flow
causing further drops. However, if the routing layer took
advantage of the presence of TARMAC, it could employ
multi-path routing. This would mean that the frames that
were originally empty would now hold data packets and
portions of the data would follow different paths to get
to the destination. This would increase the delivery ratio,
reduce the load on the network capacity and decrease the
overhead as now the frames are carrying packets rather
than being empty. The figure 19 shows the effects of
multipath routing and the adaption of frame frequency.
The adaption and multipath routing helps more packets
passing through the network if density of data sources
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are high. The does not help to much (or even hurt) those
with lower data sources density, since more collision may
happen.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we proposed a novel traffic-analysis
resitant MAC protocol that replaces typical data-driven
protocols with a fixed transmission schedule. TARMAC
can interoperate with any routing protocol (although one
that is aware of its characteristics can best utilize it).
Further, while we evaluated TARMAC with a contention
based MAC, it can interoperate with other link layer
protocols, including TDMA based ones, or be extended
to support reliability.
We evaluated the characteristics of this scheme, com-
pared to existing approaches and showed that it of-
fers significant performance advantages. Further, we
discussed improvements to the basic TARMAC to fur-
ther improve its efficiency without compromising its
resilience to traffic analysis.
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